Data cleaning, or the process of detecting and repairing inaccurate or corrupt records in the data, is inherently humandriven. State of the art systems assume cleaning experts can access the data (or a sample of it) to tune the cleaning process. However, in many cases, privacy constraints disallow unfettered access to the data. To address this challenge, we observe and provide empirical evidence that data cleaning can be achieved without access to the sensitive data, but with access to a (noisy) query interface that supports a small set of linear counting query primitives. Motivated by this, we present DPClean, a first of a kind system that allows engineers tune data cleaning workflows while ensuring differential privacy. In DPClean, a cleaning engineer can pose sequences of aggregate counting queries with error tolerances. A privacy engine translates each query into a differentially private mechanism that returns an answer with error matching the specified tolerance, and allows the data owner track the overall privacy loss. With extensive experiments using human and simulated cleaning engineers on blocking and matching tasks, we demonstrate that our approach is able to achieve high cleaning quality while ensuring a reasonable privacy loss.
INTRODUCTION
Data cleaning and data integration are essential tasks in most data science and data analytics applications. Due to magnitude and the diversity of the problem, most enterprises rely on externally developed tools to unify, clean, and transform their data. Examples include data wrangling tools, such as Trifacta [15] , data integration tools, such as Tamr [29] , and many other transformation tools [3, 10, 27] . Most of these tools are not turn-key solutions, and have a large number of tunable parameters and configurations. Self-tuned tools are often limited in their applicability and need to make many assumptions on the underlying data, which are often violated in practice. Hence, commercial cleaning tools often rely on field engineers examining the data, e.g., by eyeballing a sample, or by trying different configurations and design choices, and examining their effect on the data involved in the cleaning project. This interaction is guided mainly by two human roles: the data owner who has knowledge of the domain and can judge the quality of the cleaning process; and the cleaning engineer who is familiar with the cleaning tool and understands the implications of the configuration parameters. This interactive model customizes the cleaning solution and ensures the most effective deployment, and has been widely adopted in numerous systems [19, 28, 31] .
This model works well if the cleaning engineer has direct access to the data, but presents serious challenges when dealing with sensitive and private data (e.g., intelligence data collected by agencies, or health records in a hospital). In these settings, enterprises often adopt one of two approaches: (i) rely on internally developed tools that can be tuned using the enterprise employees; or (ii) use commercial tools, and ask external cleaning experts who are familiar with the tool to configure it using public data sets that are close in structure to the actual data. Both approaches allow the enterprise employees or the cleaning tools experts to work directly on some data, but they suffer from major shortcomings: internally developed tools present a high cost of internal development and maintenance; and working with mockup data often results in poor tuning and sub-optimal results when the solution is deployed on the actual data. In our interaction with multiple data cleaning companies and experts, these two challenges are currently severe pain points in cleaning private and sensitive data sets.
In this work, we propose a new model for cleaning private and sensitive data sets. We observe that engineers can accurately tune cleaning workflows by combining their expertise with access to just a (noisy) aggregate query interface, rather than access to the exact data (or a sample of it). We present comprehensive empirical evidence of this observation in Section 7, and highlight our key findings in Figure 1 . We asked 8 humans (real cleaning engineers) and used 200 programs that simulate human cleaners (called robots; described in Section 7) to tune workflows for two exemplar data cleaning tasks of blocking and matching in entity resolution. Figure 1a shows that humans and robots alike achieve high task quality (recall for blocking and F1-score for matching, defined in Section 2) with access to an aggregate queries interface on the database with no error. Moreover, the same is true even when aggregate queries are answered with tolerable error (Figures 1b and 1c) with the highest achievable and median accuracy degrading mono- Task Quality on Citations (a) Good cleaners (no noise)Cleaning quality on blocking and matching tasks on citations dataset: (a) shows that good cleaners (including human and manually designed robots) achieve high quality using true aggregate statistics; (b) and (c) show that the cleaning quality using noisy aggregate statistics decreases as noise level (tolerance) increases. Refer to Section 7 for details.
tonically as the error in the queries increases. The variance in the quality results from the variance in decisions made by cleaners (in Figure 1a) , and the noise in the aggregates in Figures 1b and 1c.
Inspired by these results, we propose DPClean, a system that allows external cleaning engineers tune cleaning workflows on sensitive datasets while ensuring strong privacy guarantees. Cleaning engineers explore the dataset and the space of configuration parameters for the cleaning task by adaptively posing aggregate queries to DPClean. Rather than thinking in terms of privacy bounds, the cleaning engineers are only required to specify an error tolerance on each of their queries. As the name suggests, DPClean translates queries with tolerance to query answering strategies that satisfy -differential privacy [6] , a strong privacy guarantee that permits noisy but accurate answers to aggregate queries, while provably bounding the information leakage about any single record in the database. Noisier aggregates ensure stronger privacy guarantees (smaller ). DPClean allows the data owner to specify a bound on the privacy leakage about any single record to the cleaning engineer, and ensures that every sequence of queries it answers has a total privacy leakage below this bound.
The key technical contributions of this paper are :
• DPClean provides the first solution (to the best of our knowledge) that enables general data cleaning activities on private data via a private and secure interaction between the data owner and the cleaning engineer, each expressing their constraints in the most natural and effective way to carry out the cleaning task.
• Primitives: We propose a small set of aggregate query primitives that a cleaning engineer can use to privately explore the sensitive dataset. We formulate the semantics of error tolerance for each of these query types.
• Translating Error to Privacy: We formulate and solve the novel problem of translating aggregate queries with error tolerances to differentially private mechanisms that answer these queries within the error bounds, but with the least privacy loss. This is in contrast to almost all prior work in differentially private algorithm design that assumes a constraint on privacy and minimizes error.
• Composition: We use the recently proposed moments accountant technique [2] to bound the overall privacy loss during any interaction with the cleaning engineer.
• We conduct a thorough empirical evaluation to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of DPClean for real data cleaning scenario on real data sets. Organization. Section 2 establishes notation and running examples used in this work. Section 3 presents an overview of DPClean. The three key technical contributions of this work, namely aggregate query primitives, translating error to privacy and composition are presented in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Section 7 shows the evaluation of DPClean on real datasets and cleaning tasks.
NOTATION AND BACKGROUND
Throughout the paper we consider a single table D ∈ D, with schema A = {A1, A2, . . . , A d }. Each row r ∈ D is drawn from a domain consisting of d attributes, Σ = A1 × · · · A d . Our algorithms can be extended to relations with multiple tables, which is discussed in Section 9.
Differential Privacy
An algorithm that takes as input a table D satisfies differential privacy [7, 6] if its output does not significantly change by adding or removing a single record in its input.
for any set of outputs O ⊆ O, and any pair of neighboring databases D, D such that D and D differ by adding or removing a record; i.e., |D\D ∪ D \D| = 1.
Intuitively, smaller values of and δ result in stronger privacy guarantees as D and D are harder to distinguish from the output. When δ = 0, this privacy guarantee is called -differential privacy. Differential privacy has emerged as the state-of-the-art privacy notion since (i) it is a strong mathematical privacy guarantee that hides information of individual records, but allows statistics of the dataset to be learnt, (ii) it ensures privacy even in the presence of side information about the data, and (iii) most importantly it allows one to bound the information leakage across multiple data accesses. We will describe composition and postprocessing theorems of differential privacy [7] that are used to bound privacy across multiple accesses in Section 6. Differential privacy has seen adoption in a number of real products at the US Census Bureau [12, 22, 30] , Google [9] and Apple [11] . We did not choose semantically secure or property preserving encryption, as the former does not allow the cleaning engineer to learn anything about the data, and the latter is susceptible to attacks using side information [25] .
Use Case: Entity Resolution
To illustrate the interactive process for data cleaning we consider entity resolution (also referred to as record linkage, entity matching, reference reconciliation or de-duplication) [8, 16] , as an important data cleaning application, which aims to identify entities (or objects) referring to the same real-world entity. For concreteness, we will assume that the data owner has two set of records D1 and D2 with the same schema of attributes A1, . . . , A k and the owner already posses a labeled training dataset Dt with schema A × A × {+, −}. We also assume that Dt is constructed by (a) picking a sample D of records from D1, (b) identifying for each r ∈ D , another record r ∈ D2, and (c) for each pair (r, r ), labeling the pair as either a match (+) or a non-match (−) (like in [4] ). Throughout this paper, we will assume that every record in D1 and D2 appears at most m times in the training dataset Dt (m = 1 in our experiments). Let D A typical entity resolution solution usually involves two tasks: blocking and matching. Both these tasks are achieved by learning a boolean formula P (e.g. in DNF) over similarity predicates. We express a similarity predicate p as a tuple (A, t, sim, θ) ∈ A × T × S × Θ. First, A ∈ A is an attribute in the schema and t ∈ T is a transformation of the attribute value. Next, sim ∈ S is a similarity function that usually takes a real value often restricted to [0, 1], and θ ∈ Θ is a threshold Given a pair of records (r1, r2), a similarity predicate p returns either 'True' or 'False' with semantics:
For instance, the similarity predicate (N ame, q − gram, cosine, 0.9) would return true whenever the cosine similarity of the character q-gram representation of the Name attribute in two records is greater than 0.9. Blocking and matching tasks typically use a rich library of attribute and context dependent transformations and similarity functions. There are an exponential number of possible predicates A × T × S × Θ, and an even larger number of formulas that can be constructed by combining them with boolean operators. Cleaning engineers judiciously limit the search space by their experience and domain expertise to create accurate cleaning workflows. For blocking, our goal is to find a boolean formula that identifies a small set of candidate matching pairs that cover most of the true matches.
Definition 2 (Blocking Task). Discover a boolean formula P b over similarity predicates that achieves high recall, and low blocking cost. Recall is the fraction of true matching pairs that are labeled true by P b .
Blocking cost is the fraction of pairs in D that return true for P b .
A matcher is a boolean formula Pm that identifies matching records with the least false positives and false negatives.
Definition 3 (Matching Task). Discover a boolean formula Pm over similarity predicates that achieves high recall and precision on Dt. Precision measures whether Pm classifies true non-matches as matches, and recall measures the fraction of true matches that are captured by Pm.
where D P t denotes the set of rows in Dt that satisfy P . Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of DPClean. The data owner and the cleaning engineer are the two parties involved in this system. The data owner owns the private dirty data, while the cleaning engineer is on the other side of the 'firewall' with no direct access to the dirty data. A cleaning engineer can interact with the sensitive data through the local exploration module, and the privacy engine answers these queries and tracks the privacy loss.
DPCLEAN: SYSTEM OVERVIEW

Local Exploration
Local exploration is a human-guided process, in which a cleaning engineer explores the dirty data with the goal of judiciously choosing parameters for automatic cleaning softwate in the data cleaning workflow.
Consider a blocking task (Def. 2) where the cleaner's goal is to find a disjunction of predicates p1 ∨ · · · ∨ p k from the set of all predicates S = P(A × T × S × Θ). A typical cleaning engineer interacts with the data to limit the space of predicates as follows:
Example 1 (Data Profiling). The cleaning engineer starts with profiling the data, for example, to quantify the number of missing values for each attribute, or to know the distribution of values of some attributes.
Example 2 (Picking Predicates). Based on the acquired data profile, the cleaning engineer chooses a suitable subset of attributes (e.g., ones with least number of nulls), a subset of transformations (e.g., lower case, character 2-grams), a subset of similarity functions (e.g., Jaccard or Cosine similarity) along with reasonable thresholds to construct a set of candidate predicates S ⊂ S to use to build the blocker.
Example 3 (Evaluating Predicates). Suppose p1 : cosine(2grams(r1.name), 2grams(r2.name)) > 0.7 and p2 : cosine(2grams(r1.address), 2grams(r2.address)) > 0.7 have been chosen as two predicates in S (from Example 2). The cleaner may want to measure the recall and blocking cost of p1, and p1 ∨ p2.
Example 4 (Updating Configuration). Suppose p1 has a recall of 60% and blocking cost of 0.1%, and p1 ∨ p2 has a recall of 65% and a blocking cost of 20%. The cleaner may choose to include p1 in the solution and not p1 ∨ p2 (as the latter has a high cost). On the other hand, if p1 ∨ p2 can catch 90% of the matching pairs and 1% of the nonmatching pairs, the cleaner may choose to retain p1 ∨ p2 in the solution.
Some of these aforementioned example actions -e.g. profiling and predicate evaluation -can be achieved by the cleaning engineer posing aggregate queries over the (training) data. Other actions -e.g. selecting attributes or transformation, and setting thresholds on recall/cost -need the expertise of a human cleaning engineer. These two types of actions are formulated as follows. 
We fix β to be a very small value e −15 throughout the paper. DPClean supports the following query types: linear counting queries, linear counting queries with conditions and linear top-k queries. The query types and their tolerances are defined in Section 4. We denote a sequence of querybased actions by [(q1, α1), (q2, α2), . . .] (and keep β the same for all queries).
Type-II: Smart Cleaning Choices. This type of actions are the smart choices made by the cleaning engineer based on the knowledge of the engineer (including the sequence query answers learned so far in addition to the initial expertise and the preference of this engineer). Consider Example 2, the space of choices on predicates are exponential in terms of the number of attributes, transformations, similarity functions, and possible thresholds. Different cleaning engineers can choose different sets of candidate predicates, P and even have different orders to evaluate these predicates. Moreover, there exist cleaner dependent criterion on whether to keep or prune a predicate in Example 4 and these criterion vary among engineers. We denote these engineer specific actions by C = [c1, c2, . . .], where ci corresponds to a set of choices made by the engineer after the ith type-I action qi for i > 0.
Cleaning Strategy. During the interactive process, we observe a sequence of type-I and type-II actions interleaved [. . . , qi, ci, . . .]. We use a strategy to denote a class of local explorations that using the same set of type-I actions (query types) but different type-II actions. Figure 3 shows two strategies iterates over example actions given in Example 1 to 4. These two strategies are different as they use different set of type-I actions (labeled by (qi, α)), though they share the same type-II actions (labeled by ci). In particular, the queries q1, q5 in the strategy shown in Figure 3a are count queries, while the queries q1 , q5 in Figure 3b are top-k and counting with condition queries respectively. The same engineer who applies the second strategy will see less information and may continue the exploration differently. If changing type-II actions of the strategy instance in Figure 3a , (e.g., c5b changes to 'Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: if it catches > 60% of remaining matches and < 5% of remaining non-matches), the resulted exploration still belongs to the same strategy. The differences in type-II actions are mainly due to the differences in the expertise or preference of cleaning engineers.
Privacy Engine
The privacy engine in DPClean ensures that every sequence of queries (with tolerances) posed by the cleaning engineer is answered while satisfying (B, δ)-differential privacy, where B and δ are privacy budget parameters specified Receive (q i , α i , β i ) from local exploration 4:
7:
Run M i (D) send output to local exploration 8: by the data owner. The privacy engine serves two important functions, and its operations are summarized in Algorithm 1.
The first component of this module is an error tolerance to privacy translator (Line 4) that takes each query qi and its tolerance requirement (αi, βi), and translates it into a differentially private (noise) mechanism M α i ,β i q i or simply represented as Mi. The translation is such that: (i) Mi satisfies (αi, β)-qi.type tolerance (Def. 4), (ii) Mi satisfies ( i, δ)-differential privacy with minimal privacy loss, i.e., the same mechanism Mi with different noise parameters cannot both simultaneously achieve (αi, β)-qi.type tolerance and ( , δ)-differential privacy for < . Note that constraints (i) and (ii) can be individually ensured by releasing the true answer or releasing an extremely noisy answer, respectively. Satisfying both the constraints simultaneously is a key technical innovation in this paper, and we propose a set of translation algorithms with minimal privacy loss in Section 5. While our algorithms translate individual queries with tolerances to privacy mechanisms, translating a group of queries simultaneously can result in higher accuracy (and lower privacy loss) -we defer this interesting direction for future work.
The second component named as privacy analyzer (Line 5-11) analyzes the accumulated privacy cost. Given a sequence of mechanisms (M1, . . . , Mi−1) already executed by the privacy engine that satisfy an overall (Bi−1, δ)-differential privacy, the privacy engine calls functionBi = estimateLoss(M1, . . . , Mi, δ) (Line 5) to estimate the privacy loss that would be incurred by running the next mechanism Mi (to answer the next query). IfBi exceeds the privacy budget B, then the privacy does not answer the query, and the cleaning engineer might either halt, or ask a query with a higher error tolerance. IfBi < B, then the mechanism will be executed and Mi(D) will be returned to the cleaning engineer. The privacy engine then calls Bi = analyzeLoss(M1, . . . , Mi, δ) to compute the actual privacy loss. In most cases, Bi will be the same asBi, but in some cases the two can be different. In some of our tranlsated mechanisms Mi, different execution paths have different privacy loss.Bi represents the worst case privacy loss across all execution paths (computed before running Mi), while Bi represents the actual privacy loss (after running Mi). The privacy analyzer guarantees that the execution of any sequence of mechanisms (M1, M2, . . . , Mi) before it halts is (B, δ)-differential privacy (see Section 6).
The following sections will describe the set of aggregate query primitives supported by DPClean, the privacy translator and the privacy analyzer.
PRIVACY PRIMITIVES
This section formalizes the aggregate query primitives supported in DPClean: (i) linear counting queries, (ii) linear counting queries with conditions, and (iii) top-k linear counting queries. We consider these primitives because: (1) the definition of tolerance is different for these queries, and (2) the differentially private algorithms that support these primitives are different.
Linear Counting Query (LC)
There is much work on answering linear counting queries under differential privacy [20, 13] . An LC query on a table D, denoted by q φ (·), returns the number of rows in the table that satisfy a boolean predicate φ : Σ → {0, 1}. An LC query q φ (D) can be expressed in SQL as
Given an LC query q, we define the distance between the true output q(D) and an approximate answer a as the absolute difference |q(D) − a|. The error tolerance for a mechanism for answering an LC query is defined as:
LC queries can be used to guide several cleaning tasks.
Example 5 (LC Queries for NULLs).
Counting the number of rows with NULL for an attribute is an LC query on a base table D which counts the number of rows in D where the given attribute has 'NULL' value. If the true answer is 10000, and the tolerance is (α = 10, β = .05), then the approximate answer should be within [9990, 10010] with 95% probability.
The sensitivity of an LC query on a base table, or the max change in its output due to adding or removing a tuple in the input, is always ≤ 1. LC queries can also be posed on views over the base table, and its sensitivity is bounded by the stability of the view. Stability, defined as the number of tuples added or removed from a view due to adding or removing a single tuple in the base table, can be computed using well known methods [23, 14] . In all our experiments, queries are either on base tables or views with stability 1; hence, LC queries always have sensitivity 1.
Example 6 (LC Queries for Blocking).
Given a dataset D, let Dt be a training set that consists of pairs of records in D and whether they are matching or non-matching records (as described in Sec. 2.2).
Then, recall of the blocking predicate P b : cosine(2grams(r1.name), 2grams(r2.name)) > 0.7 can be computed by first answering a LC qP b over the training set Dt that counts the number of matching records, D 
LC Query with Condition (LCC)
Given a table D, a linear counting with condition (LCC) query q φθc returns a binary output (∈ {0, 1}) based on comparing an LC query output q φ (D) with a given threshold c. The comparison operator θ can be '>, <, ≥, ≤'. The error tolerance for a mechanism answering an LCC query q φ>c is:
Error tolerance for other q φθc are defined analogously.
Example 7 (LCC Queries for NULLs).
Continuing with Example 5, instead of querying for the number of NULLs for an attribute, the cleaner can ask whether the number of NULLs is greater than some threshold, say 1000. Given a tolerance of (α = 10, β = .05), then when the answer is 1, with 95% probability the true count is > 1000 − 10; and when the answer is 0, with 95% probability the true count is < 1000 + 10;
Similarly, LCC queries can be used to check if the quality of a blocking scheme or a matching predicate reaches a threshold.
LC Top-K Query (LCT)
Given a table D, a top-k linear counting query takes in a set of boolean formulae Φ = {φ1, . . . , φL}, and outputs the top-k boolean formulae that are satisfied by the largest (or the least) number of rows in the table, denoted by q
where c k is the answer to the k th largest LC query.
This definition is equivalent to saying that with high probability all boolean formulae φ in the output of the mechanism have q φ (D) > c k − α, and every φ ∈ {φ1, . . . , φL} with q φ (D) > c k + α is in the output.
Example 8 (LCT Queries for Missing Values).
Again continuing with Example 5, suppose the cleaner wants to prune out k attributes with the most number of NULLs. Rather than using LC queries counting the number of NULLs in each attribute, the cleaner could directly ask an LCT query. For instance, suppose {A1, A2, . . . , A5} have {10000, 8000, 200, 100, 50} NULLs respectively. The top k = 2 attributes with the most number of missing values are A1, A2. The number of NULLs in A2, the kth largest LC query answer, is 8000. Given a tolerance of (α = 10, β = .05), then with high probability, attributes selected in the output should have a true count larger than 8000-10, and attributes with true count larger than 8000+10 should be appear in the output.
TRANSLATING ERROR TO PRIVACY
In this section, we provide translation algorithms for the primitives including LC, LCC, and LCT defined in the previous section. Given a query q, where q.type ∈ {LC,LCC,LCT} on a table D with (α, β)-q.type tolerance requirement for q, we propose a differentially private mechanism M α,β q , or simply denoted as M , such that (i) q is answered with mechanism M that satisfies (α, β)-q.type tolerance, (ii) mechanism M satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy, with minimal privacy loss. i.e., the same mechanism M with different noise parameters cannot both simultaneously achieve (α, β)-qi.type tolerance and ( , δ)-differential privacy for < . Note that this section considers mechanisms for one query at a time. The overall privacy of a sequence of queries will be presented in Section 6. We first present Laplace Mechanism based translations for all primitives. The privacy loss of mechanisms resulting from these translations depend only on the query type and tolerance, and not on the input data (Sec 5.1). We then discuss data-dependent translations for LCC queries that result in mechanisms with lower privacy loss for certain datasets and queries (Sec 5.2).
Laplace Mechanism based Translation
Laplace Mechanism For LC
The Laplace Mechanism is a classic differentially private algorithm that is widely used as a building block. The Laplace mechanism run with b = s/ satisfiesdifferential privacy [7] , if the sensitivity of the query is bounded by s. For ease of presentation, we LC queries are answered on base tables or views with stability 1, resulting in s = 1. The Laplace distribution has a mean of 0 and a variance of 2b 2 , and P r(η ∈ [−α, α]) < 1 − e −α/b . As the noise parameter b increases, the noise is more likely to be outside the range [−α, α].
DPClean translates LC queries q with tolerance (α, β) into the Laplace mechanism with parameter b = α ln (1/β) . Based on the properties of the Laplace random variable, it is easy to see that it satisfies the tolerance requirement and has minimal privacy loss.
Laplace Comparison Mechanism for LCC
An LCC query can also be answered using Laplace noise, similar to LC. As shown in Algorithm 2, noise η drawn from Laplace distribution with parameter b = α ln(1/(2β)) is added to the difference between q φ (D) and c. If the noisy difference is greater than 0, the mechanism outputs 'True'; otherwise, 'False'. This mechanism, referred as Laplace comparison mechanism has the following property. All proofs in this section are deferred to the Appendix B. This approach also allows a cleaning engineer to make more local decisions, for example, how much to adjust the threshold of a similarity function that consumes a larger privacy cost of
Laplace Top-k Mechanism for LCT
Given a set of boolean formulae {φ1, . . . , φL} LCT aims to find top-k boolean formulae that are satisfied by the largest number of rows in the table. This primitive can be treated as L linear counting queries {q φ 1 , . . . , q φ L } and be answered as shown in Algorithm 3. Each LC query q φ i (D) is perturbed with noise drawn from Lap(b), where b = α 2(ln L+ln(k/β)) . These boolean formulae are then sorted based on their corresponding noisy counts in descending order and the first k boolean formulae are outputted. This approach, referred as Top-k Laplace Mechanism, has the following property.
Alternatively, the cleaning engineer can pose a list of linear counting query q φ 1 , . . . , q φ L with (α, β)-LC tolerance for each linear counting query, and then answer the top-k linear counting query q k,↓ φ 1 ,...,φ L locally. However, this approach does not achieve (α, β)-LCT tolerance, i.e., 
can achieve (α , β)-LCT tolerance, where
)α > α.
Data Dependent Translation for LCC
The translation mechanisms shown above are all dataindependent as the derivation of the noise parameter and hence the privacy cost only depends on the query type and the tolerance requirement. Given the same query and tolerance requirement, it is possible to achieve smaller privacy cost using a different mechanism for certain datasets. In this section, we use linear counting query with condition LCC, q φ,>c (·), as an example to explore such so-called datadependent translations.
Intuitively, when q φ (D) is much larger (or smaller) than c, then a much larger (smaller resp.) noise can be added to q φ (D) without changing the 'True' or 'False' decision of the system. Consider the following example.
Example 9. Consider an LCC query q φ,>c , where c = 100. To achieve (α, β) tolerance for this query, where α = 10, β = 0.1 10 , the Laplace comparison mechanism requires a privacy cost of ≈ 0.25 wherein the noise added is bounded by 90α with high probability 1−β, the noisy difference q φ (D) − c + ηsign will still be greater than 0 with high probability. This is an example where a different mechanism rather than LCM α,β q φ,>c achieves the same LCC tolerance with a smaller privacy cost. Note that the tightening of the privacy cost in this example requires to know the value of q φ (D), and thus this privacy cost estimation is a data dependent approach. We need to ensure this step is also differentially private and propose two approaches next.
LCM with Poking
The first approach is summarized in Algorithm 4, named as Laplace Comparison Mechanism with Poking (LCMP). This algorithm first computes the privacy cost of LCM 
12:
Update noise η i+1 = N oiseDown(η i , i , i+1 ) [17] 13: Note that LCMP has a higher privacy loss than LCM in the worst case. However, if LCMP returns in either Line 6 or Line 8, then the privacy loss is much smaller, and it occurs often in our experiments. The privacy engine (Algorithm 1) would use the worst case privacy loss to decide whether to answer a query using LCMP (in estimateLoss), but use the actual loss (which could be much smaller) to compute the overall loss (in analyzeLoss) if LCMP has been run.
LCM with Multi-Poking
In the Laplace Comparison Mechanism with Poking (Algorithm 4), the prepaid privacy budget 0 needs to be specified, but it is difficult to determine a value without looking at the query answer. To tackle this challenge, we propose an alternative approach that allows of m pokes with increasing privacy cost. This approach is summarized in Al- . The first poke is the same as LCMP which checks if the noisy differencex0 is sufficiently greater (or smaller) than the tolerance α0 for the current privacy cost. If this is true (Lines 8-12) , then an answer 'True' (or 'False') is returned; otherwise, the privacy budget is relaxed with additional max/m. At i+1th iteration, instead of sampling independent noise, we apply the NoiseDown Algorithm [17] (details refer to Algorithm 6 in Appendix) to correlate the new noise ηi+1 with noise ηi from the previous iteration. In this way, the privacy loss of the first i + 1 iterations is i+1, and the noise added in the i + 1th iteration is equivalent to a noise generated with Laplace distribution with privacy parameter b = (1/ i+1). This approach allows the data cleaner to learn the query answer with a gradual relaxation of privacy cost. This process repeats until all max is spent. We show that Algorithm 5 achieves both tolerance and privacy requirements. Like LCMP, the worst case privacy loss of LCMMP is larger than that of LCM, but this mechanism may stop before max is used up, and hence it potentially saves privacy budget for the subsequent queries. In fact, the privacy loss of LCMMP can be a ln m m fraction of LCM's privacy loss, if the mechanism returns in the first iteration.
In DPClean, the default translation algorithms for LC, LCC, and LCT are respectively LM, LCM, and LTM described in Section 5.1. We empirically show these optimizations for LCC, but when to turn them on is an interesting future direction. Moreover, Laplace noise is used as an example for translation which achieves -differential privacy per query in this section. Other type of noises are also possible, such as Guassian noise which provides ( , δ)-differential privacy per query, and can be adapted into this system.
PRIVACY ANALYZER
Privacy analyzer is the second component in the privacy engine that analyzes the accumulated privacy cost of all interactive process. There are two functions called by this component as shown in Algorithm 1, (i)Bi = estimateLoss(M1, . . . , Mi, δ) (Line 5) to estimate the privacy loss that would be incurred by running the next mechanism Mi (to answer the next query); (ii) Bi = analyzeLoss(M1, . . . , Mi, δ) to compute the actual privacy loss after running Mi. The output of these two functions are the same in most cases, except when data-dependent translation algorithms are applied, such as Algorithms 4 and 5 which have different execution paths and hence different privacy loss.Bi represents the worst case privacy loss across all execution paths (computed before running Mi) if running Mi, while Bi represents the actual privacy loss (after running Mi). We show two types of privacy composition techniques for a sequence of differentially private algorithms.
Sequential Composition
We first present sequential composition, a simple but useful composition technique.
Theorem 8 (Sequential Composition [7] ). Let M1(·) and M2(·, ·) be algorithms with independent sources of randomness that ensure ( 1, δ1)-and ( 2, δ2)-differential privacy respectively.
An algorithm that outputs both
Given a sequence of data independent translation mechanisms M1, M2, . . . , Mi shown in Section 5.1 that satisfy differential privacy with cost of 1, 2, . . . , i respectively, both functions estimateLoss and analyzeLoss output ( 1 + · · · + i). For data dependent translation mechanisms, estimateLoss considers the worst privacy loss of ; otherwise, the actual privacy cost Bi increments by
Advanced Composition
Advanced composition techniques [7] allows the privacy parameters to degrade more slowly than sequential composition by considering the privacy loss as a random variable rather than as a fixed worst case cost. DPClean uses the Moments Accountant technique [2, 24] summarized below. Unlike sequential composition, which applies to blackbox mechanisms, advance composition techniques requires knowledge of the mechanisms (and the noise distributions used within).
The sequence of differentially private mechanisms M1, M2, . . . Mi run by the privacy engine can be considered as an instance of adaptive composition which is modeled by letting the auxiliary input of the ith mechanism Mi be the output of all the previous mechanisms, i.e., Mi :
The moment accountant keeps track of a bound on the moments of the privacy loss random variable of each mechanism defined below.
For neighboring databases D, D ∈ D, a given mechanism M , an auxiliary input aux, the privacy loss of M outputting o ∈ O can be captured using the random variable:
If M satisfies -DP, then c(o; M, aux, D, D ) < with probability 1, but could be much smaller. Let µM (λ; aux, D, D ) called the λth moment be the log of the moment generating function of c evaluated at λ:
The privacy loss of a mechanism requires to bound all possible µM (λ; aux, D, D ), i.e.,
where the maximum is taken over all possible aux and all the neighboring databases D, D .
Theorem 9 (Moments Accountant [2]
). Let µM (λ) be defined as above. Then 1. Composability: Suppose that a mechanism M consists of a sequence of adaptive mechanisms M1, . . . , Mi where M l :
Tail bound:
The mechanism M is ( , δ)-differentially private for = min λ (µM(λ) − ln δ)/λ, for any δ > 0.
By the theorem above, the privacy analyzer only needs to bound µM i (λ) at each step and sum them to bound the moments of the sequence of mechanisms M. Then the tail bound can be used to convert the moment bound to the ( , δ)-differential privacy guarantee. The analysis of a single Laplace noise based Laplace Mechanism [24] that adds η ∼ Lap(b) leads to a privacy loss
when λ > 1; µ Lap(b) (λ) = 1/b + e −1/b − 1 when λ = 1. When λ goes to ∞, µ Lap(b) (λ) goes to 1/b. As the translation mechanisms shown in Section 5 are all based Laplace noise, a sequence of these mechanisms can be analyzed as a sequence of adaptive Laplace mechanisms that add noises to the corresponding linear counting queries. In particular, the Laplace top-k mechanism (Algorithm 3) for LCT draws a vector of noises (η1, . . . , ηL) from Lap(b) L , where
Similar to sequential composition, the outputs of the two functions estimateLoss and analyzeLoss are the same if all mechanisms are data independent. When data-dependent algorithms are run, these two functions vary in output. Suppose Mi is LCM with poking (Algorithm 4) that may run only one Laplace mechanism with Lap(1/ 0) or two Laplace mechanisms. Function estimateLoss considers the worst case where two Laplace mechanisms are run while function analyzeLoss depends on the execution path. If only one Laplace mechanism was run, then the moments accountant in analyzeLoss considers the privacy loss of this Laplace mechanism alone, and the privacy cost can be saved for later mechanisms. Similarly, Laplace mechanism with multipoking (Algorithm 5) may also stops at i before the maximum privacy budget is used up. As the noises drawn before this mechanisms are all correlated and the last noise ηi follows the distribution of Lap(1/ i), analyzeLoss considers the privacy loss of Lap(1/ i) as the increment to the actual privacy loss, while estimateLoss considers the privacy loss of Lap(1/ max) as the worst case before running Mi.
Overall Privacy Guarantee
We show that the interactive process by DPClean satisfies the privacy constraint specified by the data owner.
Theorem 10 (Privacy Guarantee of DPClean).
The interactive process by DPClean including privacy engine represented by Algorithm 1 and local exploration satisfies (B, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. (sketch) When i = 1, no mechanism has been executed yet, and hence B0 = 0, therefore the interactions are definitely (B, δ)-differentially private. Suppose (M1, . . . , Mi−1) is (B, δ)-differential privacy with an actual privacy loss Bi−1 ≤ B. Given a new mechanism Mi is proposed, the function estimateLoss considers the worst privacy loss of Mi regardless the data and outputsBi. This step does not cost additional budget. If the privacy analyzer decides to run this mechanism Mi asBi ≤ B, then the actual privacy loss outputted by analyzeLoss after executing Mi is Bi which should be smaller thanBi and hence no more than B. If the privacy analyzer decides to deny the query, the actual privacy cost remains unchanged to Bi−1. By induction, the actual privacy cost is always no more than B. Moreover, the local exploration is a post-processing step, called as post-processing immunity [7] , which does not consume additional privacy cost. Therefore, the interactive process by DPClean satisfies (B, δ)-differential privacy.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS
This section evaluates the usability and effectiveness of DPClean with real data cleaning scenarios on real data sets. Our experiments demonstrate the following:
• Cleaning engineers can accurately tune cleaning workflows by combining their expertise with answers to aggregate query primitives (proposed in Section 4) with tolerable error. (Figure 1 and Figure 
Experiment Setup
Cleaning Tasks & Datasets. The cleaning tasks for entity resolution defined in Section 2.2 including blocking and matching are considered in this evaluation. Two datasets [5] are used: restaurants and citations (Table 1) . For each dataset, the cleaning engineer would like to identify entities from two set of records D1 and D2 under the same schema with k attributes (A1, . . . , A k ). The training data Dt for entity resolution tasks is sampled with the method described in Section 2.2 and half of the training record pairs are positive examples. Dt is a view over the base tables, and we make it have stability equal to 1 by ensuring that each record in the base tables appears exactly once in Dt. Thus, the sensitivity of LC queries over Dt have sensitivity 1.
Local Exploration Strategies. We considered 8 humans (real cleaning engineers) and programs that simulate human cleaning (called robots) for evaluating DPClean. Each real cleaning engineer was asked to complete one matching and one blocking task under one setting (a fixed tolerance level α and dataset citations) using the set of primitive templates provided by the system. Each human cleaner may use different aggregate query primitives and make difference choices for type-II actions, resulting in different cleaning strategy. All robot cleaners apply one of the two blocking strategies shown in Figure 3 but vary in the choices made for type-II actions (c1 to c6 in Figure 3 ), which are sampled from a manually curated set of choices. These two class of strategies are respectively denoted by BS1 which uses only LC primitives and BS2 which uses only LCC and LCT primitives. Similarly, two strategies M S1 (LC only) and M S2 (LCC and LCT) are considered for matching tasks -the primary difference being that the matching rule is a conjunction of similarity predicates, while the blocking rule is a disjunction. We defer details of the user study and robot cleaning strategies to the Appendix A.
Implementation Details. We implemented DPClean using Java-1.8 and run the experiments on a Ubuntu server 16.04 with 16 cores and 64 GB memory. SimMetrics [1] package are used for the set of similarity functions and score computations. The default DPClean applies Laplace Mechanism based translations (Section 5.1) and advanced composition techniques (Section 6.2). Table 2 lists all the parameter notations used in the experiments. We set the tolerance level α = t·|Dt|, where t ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.04, . . . , 0.64}, a privacy budget of = B, and δ = 3 · 10 −7 . 
Results
Aggregate Queries With No Privacy Constraint
We empirically establish that aggregate primitives (LC, LCC, LCT) are sufficient for engineers to author accurate cleaning workflows, even when the statistics are tolerably noisy (and in the absence of privcy B = ∞). For a given cleaning task -blocking or matching -we asked 2 humans to complete the cleaning task on citations dataset using query primitives LC, LCC, or LCT at tolerance α = t|Dt| where t ∈ {0, 0.02, 0.08, 0.32} and implemented 200 robots (100 robots for BS1/MS1 and BS2/MS1 each) that use the private primitives with tolerance α = t|Dt| from 0 (no noise) to 0.64|Dt|. Figure 1a shows the box plot for the final task quality by humans and robots when no noise is added to the query answers. We observe that humans (red points) finished the task with high quality: recall > 0.95 for blocking and F1-score > 0.9 for matching. The robot cleaners (blue box plots) also achieved similar high quality as human cleaners. The variance across robot cleaners, attributed to the different choices each cleaner makes for type-II actions, is low since these are chosen from a manually curated set. Figures 1b and 1c show the task quality with tolerance for blocking and matching respectively, when noises is introduced into query answers. We observe that the quality degrades when error tolerance α increases from 0.01|Dt| to 0.64|Dt|, and the quality is above 0.8 for most of the robot cleaners when the tolerance ≤ 0.08. This is evidence that cleaning tasks can be completed with good quality even with access to only noisy aggregate queries. The behavior of the human cleaners are similar to that of robot cleaners, providing further evidence of this fact and motivating the feasibility of using differentially private query answers to achieve both task quality and data privacy. Moreover, Figures 1b  and 1c , also show that the task quality is roughly monotonic in the noise level, i.e. the quality degrades when error tolerance increases from 0.01|Dt| to 0.64|Dt|.
In Figure 4 , we choose one robot cleaner each for blocking strategy BS1 and BS2 and matching strategy MS1 and MS2 from the 200 robots used in Figure 1 , and report the task quality of 100 runs of the same robot cleaner for both datasets. This experiment eliminates the variance due to cleaner choices and considers only the randomness from noise. The same monotonicity property is observed that the quality decreases as tolerance increases. As tolerance increases, each query answer is noisier leading to sub-optimal cleaning choices and poorer cleaning quality. We also observe from Figure 4 (left two columns) that the blocking quality for different datasets restaurants and citations are similar at the same tolerance and the same strategy.This is also true for matching (right two columns in Figure 4 ) except that the matching task is more sensitive to noise and the strategy. When tolerance increases up to 0.16|Dt|, we see large variance in matching quality for MS2, but MS1 still have reasonably quality at this tolerance level.
Varying Privacy Constraint
We now consider blocking and matching tasks using DPClean (with privacy). Given a privacy constraint B (i.e. = B, δ = e −15 ) and a cleaning task, we run programs to simulate local explorations (BS1 for blocking and MS1 for matching) at a fixed tolerance α = 0.08|Dt|. Figure 5 shows the cleaning quality of 100 runs of BS1 and MS1 on restaurants and citations at B = {0.004, 0.008, 0.02, 0.04, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5}. We observe that the expected task quality (median and variance) improves as the budget constraint increases and gets stable after reaching B ≥ 0.5 for restaurants and B ≥ 0.008 for citations. Since we fixed tolerance, the privacy loss for each aggregate query is also fixed. Thus, B directly controls the number of queries DPClean answers before halting. For small B, only a few queries are answered and the cleaning quality is close to random guessing. After B reaches a certain value, the cleaning engineer has sufficient number of queries answered and be able to obtain good cleaning quality. For the same task, the smallest B to achieve high quality is higher for restaurants than citations. Since the former has a much smaller training datasize than the latter, given the same t, the bound on the absolute error for queries over restaurants is smaller than that of citations and hence cost more privacy budget per query.
The privacy loss under sequential composition is much higher than under advanced composition. The sequence of mechanisms that results in = 0.5, δ = e −15 for restaurants and (0.008, e −15 ) for citations has privacy loss of = 176.25 and = 15.375, resp., under sequential composition.
Varying Tolerance
This section shows the performance of DPClean at a fixed privacy constraint with varying tolerance for query answers. Figure 6 shows the cleaning quality of 100 runs of BS1 and MS1 on two datasets for tolerance α = t|Dt|, where t ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64}. Unlike the monotonicity between task quality and tolerance shown in Figure 4 with no privacy (B = ∞), the quality improves first as tolerance relaxes and then degrades again. This is because when there is a privacy constraint, the cleaning engineers can ask only a limited number of queries. Given a fixed privacy budget B = 0.1, when tolerance is reasonably small, increasing tolerance allows more queries can be answered. Though answers are noisy, they are still sufficient to help make decisions. As tolerance continues increasing, the answers to queries get very noisy and misleading resulting in the drop in quality, even though many more questions can be answered. Note that the optimal tolerance for both datasets are actually similar in values: 0.16|Dt| = 0.16 · 100 = 16 for restaurants and 0.02|Dt| = 0.02 · 1000 = 20 for citations. Thus suggest an interesting direction for future work: choosing the optimal error tolerance for different questions in an interactive cleaning workflow. Matching on Citations (B=0.1) Figure 6 : Performance of DPClean for blocking (BS1) and matching (MS1) on restaurants and citations at fixed privacy constraint B = 0.1 with increasing tolerance from 0.01|Dt| to 0.64|Dt|. There exists an optimal tolerance to achieve highest quality at a given privacy constraint: 0.16|Dt| = 16 for restaurants and 0.02|Dt| = 20 for citations. 
Exploring Data Dependent Translations
This section shows that data dependent translations (Section 5.2) by switching the LCM translation (Algorithm 2) for LCC queries to LCM with poking (LCMP, Algorithm 4 or LCC with multi-poking (LCMMP, Algorithm 5) can increase cleaning accuracy. Figure 7 shows the average recall achieved by 100 runs of BS2 for blocking on restaurants and citations datasets with fixed tolerance α = 0.08|Dt| and as privacy (B) increases from 0.004 to 0.5. We choose BS2 as it uses LCC queries. DPClean attains a higher recall for both datasets at a smaller B for both datasets under LCMMP. In restaurants, LCMMP achieves recall of 1.0 at B = 0.1, while LCMP and LCM achieve the same recall only at B = 0.2. In ciations, LCMMP achieves 0.75 recall with B as small as 0.004, while LCM requires B > 0.01 to achieve the same recall. This is because more LCMMP queries are being answered for the same B. The improvements due to LCMP over LCM are not as significant, though we see some improvements in citation. In results not shown, we see similar results for MS2.
RELATED WORK
Tools for data cleaning and data integration [15, 29, 27, 3, 10] have been developed for enterprises to unify, clean, and transform their data. These tools are inapplicable for cleaning private data.
PrivateClean [18] is the most relevant prior work for privacy-preserving data cleaning, and differs from DPClean in a number of aspects. First, PrivateClean assumes a different setting, where no active data cleaner is involved. The data owner perturbs the dirty data without cleaning it, while the data analyst who wants to obtain some aggregate queries will clean the pertubed dirty data. However, to clean the private dirty data, the data analyst should have the prior knowledge on the suitable set of transformations required for the given data. In our setting, the set of transformations for cleaning the given data are the output of the exploration process by the cleaning engineer, and hence should not be known in advance. Moreover, all the privacy perturbation techniques in PrivateClean are based on record-level perturbation, which (a) only work well for attributes with small domain sizes, and (b) has asymptotically poorer utility for aggregated queries. Moreover, the randomized response technique used for sampling string attributes in PrivateClean does not satisfy differential privacy -it leaks the active domain of the attribute. In experiments not shown, we reimplement PrivateClean so that it satisfies DP. Its quality was consistently poor (0.5 recall for Blocking and < 0.8 F-1 for Matching on restaurants) for all privacy levels considered in this paper, while DPClean is able to achieve high quality for reasonable privacy levels.
There are general systems for differentially private query answering over relations such as PINQ [23] , wPINQ [26] and elastic sensitivity [14] . However, DPClean is the first system where the data analyst specifies accuracy constraints on queries that are translated into privacy losses by the system. There is concurrent work [21] that considers analysts who specify accuracy constraints for machine learning tasks. DPClean differs in two aspects: (a) we use theoretical properties of the mechanisms to perform the error to accuracy translation, and (b) DPClean ensures differential privacy, while the other work ensures a variant called ex-post differential privacy. We can show that ex-post differential privacy may permit mechanisms that leak records in the table with high probability. We omit details due to space constraints.
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed DPClean, a system that allows data cleaners interact with and help clean sensitive datasets while ensuring that their interactions satisfy differential privacy. Using experiments with human and simulated data cleaners on blocking and matching tasks, we established that DPClean allows high quality cleaning with a reasonable privacy loss.
DPClean opens many interesting future research directions. In terms of cleaning, we believe the primitives in DPClean can be extended to support other cleaning tasks like schema matching, and related tasks like feature engineering and tuning machine learning workflows. This would also require extending our system to handle relations with multiple tables, constraints like functional dependencies, etc. In terms of privacy, we can extend DPClean's privacy engine to use other forms of composition (like in the sparse vector technique), and consider translating groups of linear queries together that capture typical queries like histograms, CDFs and sets of range queries. DPClean turns the differentially private algorithm design problem on its head -it minimizes privacy loss given an accuracy constraint. This problem has applications beyond data cleaning and can trigger an entirely new line of research. queries from DPClean. Then DPClean answered these queries within the given query tolerance and sent the query answer back to the user. In these tests, users had no privacy constraint B = ∞, and hence they could ask unlimited queries until they were satisfied with the exploration results.
A.2 Strategy Instances for Matching Task
Consider the exploration space S for a matcher as all possible conjunctions of predicates in the form of pi ∧ · · · ∧ pj. This space can also be expressed as the power set of the predicates domain. i.e. S = P(A × T × S × Θ). Similar to the interactive process for blocking (Example 1 and 2, the cleaning engineer for matching will first select a small number of candidate predicates after profiling the data. However, the matching task has a different objective and exploration space. Adding a new predicate p to the conjunction formed by the predicates in the current output O will prune away both some matches and non-matches. The cleaner aims to limit the number of matches missed and maximize the number of non-matches pruned by adding this new predicate. Hence, the cleaning engineer typically selects a predicate p if p ∧ O missed few matches but pruned many new nonmatches with respect to O, where O is the set of predicates already selected. Two strategy instances are shown in Figure 8 which use different primitives. These two instances have similar profiling and picking predicates as blocking strategies in Figure 3a and hence are not shown, but different in c5b, q5a, q5b, q5 a, q5 b for different objectives.
A.3 Modeling Cleaning Engineers
This section describes the programs simulating local exploration (called robot cleaners). Consider the blocking strategy 1 shown in Figure 3a , the corresponding cleaner model encodes the space of all the parameters involved in the cleaner's decisions c1-c6. Table 3 summarizes the space of all the parameters for c1-c6 in blocking strategy 1. From c1 to c4, the program chooses (i) a subset of attributes x1 of size ranging from 2 up to the total number of attributes |A|, (ii) a subset of transformations x2 from T = {2grams, 3grams, SpaceT okenization}, (iii) a subset of similarity functions x3 from S = {Edit, SmithW ater, Jaro, Cosine, Jaccard, Overlap, Dif f }, and (iv) x6 thresholds from the range of [x4, x5], where x4 ∈ (0, 0.5), x5 ∈ (0.5, 1), and x6 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The cross product of these choices form a set of predicates P , and c5a picks an ordering x7, one of the permutation of P . In c5b, the model sets the criterion for pruning or keeping a predicate p from the top list of P . In particular, the model sets x8 and x9 as the minimum fraction of the remaining matches caught and the maximum fraction of the remaining non-matches caught by p ∨ O respectively, where x8 ∈ [0.2, 0.5] and x9 ∈ [0.1, 0.2]. These values are reset as x8 = x8/x10 and x9 = x9x10 where x10 ∈ {2, 3} if all predicates have been checked but O = ∅. In c6, the model considers three possible styles of cleaners on trusting the noisy answers: neutral style corresponds to trust the noisy answers; for optimistic (pessimistic) style, the cleaner trusts the values by adding (subtracting) α/5 to (from) the noisy answers. If these criterion are met and the blocking cost over training data Dt is less than a fixed cutoff threshold (e.g., a hardware constraint, we set 550 and 55 for Citations and restaurants datasets respectively). An instance of all variables C = (x1, . . . , x11) in Table 3 forms a robot cleaner. The model for other strategies is similarly constructed.
A.4 Optimal Error Tolerance
Section 7.2.3 shows that there exists an optimal fixed tolerance to achieve the highest possible quality at a given privacy constraint B = 0.1. We further investigate this optimal tolerance by reporting the empirical best tolerance for differ- A cleaner model C = {x1, . . . , x11} for c1-c6 in Figure 3a  c1 Choose x1, an ordered subset of attributes with least Nulls, where x1 ∈ {2, 3, |A|} c2
Choose x2, an ordered subset of transformations from T, where |x2| ∈ {1, 2, 3} c3
Choose x3, an ordered subset of similarity functions from S, where |x3| ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} c4
Choose a lower bounds x4 and a upper bound x5 of threshold range, where x5 ∈ (0.5, 1), x4 ∈ (0, 0.5), and evenly choose x6 thresholds in order of either ASC or DSC, and x6 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} c5a Predicate p is sequentially selected based the order of x7 ∈ Permute(x1 × x2 × x3 × x6) c5b Chooses a criterion for predicate p: if it catches < x8 fraction of the remaining matches and > x9 fraction of remaining non-matches, where x8 ∈ [0.2, 0.5] and x9 ∈ [0.1, 0.2]. Reset x8 = x8/x10 and x9 = x10x9, x10 ∈ {2, 3} if all queries have been asked but O = ∅. c6
Choose method x11 ∈ {neutral, optimistic, pessimistic} to take tolerance into account. If conditions are met, and the blocking cost is less than cutoff threshold, add p to the output O and remove it from P . Matching on Citations (t=0.08) Figure 10 : Performance of PrivateClean and DPClean for blocking (BS1) and matching (MS1) tasks on restaurants and citations with increasing privacy budget B at a fixed tolerance 0.08|Dt|: DPClean can achieve high cleaning quality at a much smaller privacy budget.
ent privacy constraints B. For each privacy constraint B, we ran the same local exploration programs over different tolerance values from 0.01|Dt| to 0.64|Dt| and noted down the tolerance that achieved the highest average in quality. Figure 9 plots the means of the blocking or matching quality of 100 runs of a robot cleaner (BS1 or MS1) on two datasets respectively by setting the tolerance as the optimal value (opt) or a fixed value t|Dt| where t ∈ {0.02, 0.08, 0.32}. The quality when setting tolerance at the optimal value is definitely better than all the other fixed tolerance value. Moreover, the optimal value at each privacy constraint is also shown in the plot. We observe that when privacy budget B increases, the optimal tolerance value decreases in general. This is because a query with smaller tolerance requires higher budget. Given a more relaxed privacy constraint (larger B), then more questions at a smaller tolerance can be answered, which leads to good quality at smaller tolerance. The first optimal tolerance on restaurants dataset is random because none questions can be answered when B = 0.04. Moreover, cleaning with a larger tolerance converges faster than a smaller tolerance (e.g., 0.08|Dt| vs. 0.02|Dt|) as privacy constraint increases. All these interesting results lead to an important direction for future work on how to choose optimal error tolerance for queries in an interactive cleaning workflow. 
A.5 Comparisons with Baseline
In this section, we compare DPClean with prior work PrivateClean [18] . PrivateClean uses generalized randomized response (GRR) to sanitize the input training data Dt. The same set of queries from the cleaning strategies are answered directly on the sanitized data, unlike DPClean perturbs the answers of a query. For each record in Dt, a random value is sampled for each attribute of this record. To correctly ensure differential privacy, the sample space should be the entire domain including both active and inactive domain (see Section 8) of this attribute. However, given a large domain such as strings of unbounded length, the probability of sampling the true value of that record is very small and hence introduce very large error. To limit the domain, for each string attribute, we transform the first 10 characters of the string values into 5 non-overlapping 2grams. For each 2gram, we apply GRR to sample a value, and then concatenate these 5 values into a new string as the sanitized data.
Given the error tolerance for a linear counting query, we find the sampling probability to achieve this error tolerance. For instance, when the tolerance is α = 0.01|Dt|, the corresponding probability to sampling the true 2-gram value should be above 0.902 (Appendix E of PrivateClean [18] ), and hence requires at least a budget of 0.282 (Lemma 1 of PrivateClean [18] ). We reported the privacy cost to achieve tolerance values from 0.01|Dt| to 0.64|Dt| for a 2gram on the restaurants dataset by the above GRR approach and the number of pairs of true 2 grams can be sampled given a total budget of B = 0.1 in Table 4 . Given the total privacy budget B = 0.1, no true training pair nor even single attribute is sampled in the output. Therefore, the cleaning process becomes random guessing and the comparison between PrivateClean and DPClean in shown in Figure 10 shows that PrivateClean has a poor cleaning quality due to random guessing, but DPClean achieves good quality with reasonable cost B > 0.1.
B. THEOREMS AND PROOFS
B.1 Laplace Comparison Mechanism
We show Theorem 2 that given a linear counting query with condition q φ,>c (·) for any D ∈ D,Laplace comparison mechanism (Algorithm 2) denoted by LCM α,β q φ,>c (·), can achieve (α, β)-LCC tolerance with minimal -differential privacy cost, where
. The probability to fail the tolerance requirement is (i) when q φ (D) < c − α,
and (ii) when q φ (D) > c + α,
Hence, LCM achieves α-LCC with probability 1 − β. This mechanism also satisfies 1/b-differential privacy by postprocessing [7] . Hence, setting b = α ln(1/(2β))
gives the least cost.
B.2 Laplace Top-k Mechanism
We would like show the privacy and tolerance requirement of Laplace Top-k Mechanism stated in Theorem 4.
We first show the proof for tolerance requirement: given a top-k linear counting query, q Proof. The output of Algorithm 3 are {q φ i 1 , . . . , q φ i k } which have the highest noisy counts. Suppose their noisy counts are in the order ofxi 1 ≥xi 2 ≥ · · · ≥xi k . As c k is the true answer to the kth largest linear counting query of all L linear counting queries, the largest answer to any L − k + 1 linear counting queries should be no less than c k . Hence, we have
Similarly, the smallest answer to any k linear counting queries should be no greater than c k . Hence, we have
First we would like to show that by setting b ≤ 
Hence, every selected φ ∈ a has q φ (D) > c − α with probability 1 − β for |a| = k. Then, we would like to show that if a count q φ (D) is sufficiently large, then the probability of missing it in the output is small. 
Hence, all boolean formulae φ ∈ {φ1, . . . , φL} with q φ (D) > c + α are selected with probability 1 − β.
Then we show that Algorithm 3 achieves minimaldifferential privacy cost, where = k/b = 
For each l ∈ {i1, . . . , i k }, we have
Hence, if η l ≥ r * l + 1 for all l ∈ {i1, . . . , i k }, then (i1, . . . , i k ) will be the output when the table is D and the noise vector is (ηi 1 , . . . , ηi k , . . . , ηL) . The probabilities below are over the choices of (ηi 1 , . . . , ηi k ) ∼ Lap(k/ ) k . 
For the other direction, given these fixed noises, for l ∈ {i1, . . . , i k }, we define
For each l ∈ {i1, . . . , i k }, we have 
Therefore, -differential privacy is guaranteed.
B.3 Data Dependent Translation for LCC
We first provide full proof for Theorem 6: given a LCC query q φ,>c , for any table D ∈ D, LCM with Poking (Algorithm 4), denoted by LCM P α,β q φ,>c achieves (α, β)-LCC tolerance, and satisfies -differential privacy cost, where = 
Hence, LCMP achieves α-LCC with probability 1 − β. The poking part spends a privacy budget of 0 and the second part using LCM spends a budget of LCM Theorem 2. By composition of differential privacy (Theorem 8), LCMP satisfies ( 0 + LCM )-differential privacy. Proof. (sketch) The NoiseDown Algorithm shown in Algorithm 6 correlates the new noise ηi+1 with noise ηi from the previous iteration In this way, the composition of the first i+1 iterations is i+1, and the noise added in the i+1th iteration is equivalent to a noise generated with Laplace distribution with privacy budget i+1 and the first i iterations also satisfy i-DP for i = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1 (Theorem 9 [17] ). This approach allows data cleaner to learn the query answer with a gradual relaxation of privacy cost. At ith iteration, the probability to fail is β/m. Hence, when outputting an answer at ith iteration, the probability to fail the requirement is iβ/m < β. The proof for the tolerance is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.
